OPERATION OVERLORD
6 JUNE 1944
American General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed to the post of Supreme Commander in December 1943. With his subsequent selection of other senior commanders the original plan underwent some fundamental modifications. The ground commander, during the initial assault phase and subsequent beachhead buildup, was British General Bernard Montgomery. Montgomery expanded the proposed invasion frontage from about 25 miles to 50 miles and increased the allocation of initial assault troops from the 3 to 5 divisions. Additionally a further 3 divisions of paratroopers – 2 American airborne divisions and 1 British airborne division – were allocated. Their mission was to seize vital bridges and crossroad strong-points at each end of the invasion area to protect the eastern and western flanks from counterattack during the initial landings.
The assault force was divided into a western task force (American troops), landing on two beaches in the western section of the invasion front, and an eastern task force (British and Canadian troops) allocated to three beach areas in the eastern section. Commando and Ranger forces were also allocated to the initial assault with responsibility to neutralize specific coastal strong-points thought to be too difficult for regular infantry to tackle successfully.
The main D-Day objectives were for each assault force to secure their respective beachheads and to progress inland. By D+1 they were to link up the beachheads into one continuous front. During D+2 to D+9 they were expected to gain enough depth to form a secure staging area for the substantial follow up forces. Once sufficient strength had been built up a breakout towards Paris and the Rhine was planned. The senior commanders knew, that from the outset, a race against the Germans would be in play. The Allies would have to build up their forces, in the beachhead area, faster than the Germans could bring up a strong counter attack force. To impede the movement of German men, supplies and armour, road and rail communications across the north of France were subjected to intensive bombing raids prior to the landings.
On D-Day itself the conduct of the amphibious landings benefited from the costly lessons from previous raids and landings. Important amongst these were extensive bomber, fighter and naval bombardment support and improved radio communications at all levels. A number of unique solutions to the problems of landing under fire, on heavily defended open beaches, were developed. These were most likely used on the British and Canadian beaches where specialized armoured units led the attack. An eccentric, former Major General Percy Hobart, who had been personally selected by Churchill to modernize Britain’s tank program, developed so called "Funnies." These included the "flail tank" whose rotating drum and chains cleared paths through mine fields and other adaptations designed to clear tank obstacles and pill boxes.
In the absence of the early capture of a functioning harbour it was essential to provide for the safe landing of thousands of tons of supplies and equipment each day during the period of build up. One planner suggested that the invasion force should "take a harbour over with them." A similar idea had been promulgated by Churchill during WW1. Twenty thousand workers laboured for eight months to construct an ingenious solution to the challenge. The result of their labours became known as "Mulberry Harbours" which were eventually installed at both American and British beaches.
The landings were planned to start at or near dawn. In addition Rommel's extensive beach obstacles further narrowed options to a period of low tide or on a rising tide. It was during these periods that the beach obstacles would be exposed and could be more easily "removed" by assault engineers. There was also a need for sufficient moonlight on the night before the landings to assist the airborne forces in achieving their objectives. These various factors gave the planners the rather limited choice of either June 5th, 6th or 7th as the earliest possible invasion dates. If the notoriously fickle Channel weather proved uncooperative the next window of opportunity would be June 19th.
"It is my unshakeable decision to make this front impregnable against every enemy" - so said Hitler in a speech he delivered in December 1941. He boasted, to the world, that Germany controlled the entire west coast of Europe from the Arctic Ocean to the Bay of Biscay. He ordered the building of some 15,000 strong-points which were to be manned by 300,000 troops. Construction officially started in early 1942. For 2 years a quarter of a million, mainly slave labourers, worked night and day. They used more than a million tons of steel and poured over 20 million cubic yards of concrete. The heaviest concentration of defence works was along the narrowest part of the English Channel between the Netherlands and Le Havre in Normandy.
As it became obvious that the Allies were building up to an invasion, in November 1943 Hitler appointed Field Marshall Rommel initially to the position of Inspector of Coastal Defences and later to the command of Army Group B which occupied the channel coastal defences. He moved to France in December 1943 and immediately started to apply his significant energy and experience to further improving the defences. He planned to create an impassable zone, initially100 meters deep, along the whole channel coast and to eventually extend its depth to a kilometer by the laying of 200 million mines. He dramatically accelerated the rate at which beach obstacles were constructed and, by May 11th, over half a million had been raised along the channel foreshore and on likely glider and parachute landing zones behind the beaches. Additionally some areas immediately behind the beaches were inundated with water to further inhibit any movement off the beaches and to contain the attacker’s beachheads.
As a further preparation for a possible amphibious invasion in the west Hitler issued a decree – Fuhrer Order 51 in November 1943. Rommel was well aware that the Allies supremacy in the air would inhibit daytime movements once battle was joined – he had been subjected to this experience in North Africa. He therefore planned to stop and contain the invaders at the water’s edge. Then he planned to have sufficient Panzer (Armoured) divisions, closely available, to counter attack and overrun the beachheads before they became established. From May onwards the Germans braced themselves for an attack they were sure would come. They were puzzled when the relatively mild weather of May passed with no sign of the enemy and took the opportunity to complete more obstacles on the beaches. Rommel was now confidant that his improved "Atlantic Wall" would hold the enemy on the beaches. He was convinced that the Allies would attack on a high tide – at dawn. These two conditions coincided for a few days around the middle of June.
What Rommel didn't know was that on May 17th General Eisenhower set the invasion date for June 5th. However, in the event, bad weather caused a postponement of 24 hours. This was an unwelcome delay for the combat ready force and even more so for those onboard ships recalled while at sea. However an improvement in the weather saw the departure of the armada of over 5,000 ships. These included many kinds of landing craft, troop transports, minesweepers, radar & communications vessels (Fighter Direction Tenders), escort and bombardment naval vessels.
OPERATION OVERLORD
6 JUNE 1944
That night over 820 aircraft carrying paratroopers, or towing gliders, left their air bases in southern England and headed for predetermined landing zones in Normandy. They were preceded by over 1,000 bombers to soften up German coastal defenses prior to the early morning sea-borne landings. Some bombers also dropped by parachute hundreds of life-size dummies all over Normandy as part of a deception and confusion plan.
Shortly after midnight, the American 101st and 82nd airborne divisions parachuted into their prescribed landing zones at the base of the Cotentin peninsula to the west end of the invasion area. Cloud and flak disrupted the air armada’s formation on the final run-in and scattered the paratroopers. They suffered many casualties by drowning as some were dropped into the deliberately inundated areas. Nevertheless these elite troops secured their main objectives and held on grimly – their link up with the main sea-borne landings was only hours away.
The British 6th airborne division of paratroopers, and a special task force landing in gliders, simultaneously landed in the east side of the invasion area and moved quickly to secure their objectives. The glider task force quickly captured key bridges on the Orne River and Caen Canal. After a fierce fight a substantially under strength paratrooper force subdued the Merville battery which was in position to target the Allied invasion ships soon to appear off the beaches. The vanguard airborne troops landings were considered a heartening success.
(Photograph - LCT flotillas in Southampton prior to departure for Normandy) The 5,000 ships and craft of the invasion fleet arrived off the beaches before dawn. Despite a slight improvement in the weather gusty winds churned up five to six foot waves in the English Channel and most of the 170,000 assault troops suffered from seasickness. German coastal batteries started firing on the fleet at 5.30 a.m. and the Allied naval bombardment countered at 6 a.m. The battleships and cruisers were about 6 miles off the beaches and the destroyers held off at about 4 miles. As the orange flames from their gun muzzles lit up the dawn the thunderous noise of their bombardment rolled up and down the coast. The bombardment detonated some large minefields and knocked out a few defensive positions but the clouds of smoke and sand soon made the shore almost invisible. Many German strong points escaped serious damage.
The western task force of American troops started their run in to the two invasion beaches designated Utah and Omaha. The U.S. 4th division was scheduled to land on the westernmost beach (Utah) at the foot of the Cotentin peninsula. When about 300 yards off the beach they fired smoke signals in the air and the bombardment lifted to defences further inland. At 6.31 a.m. the first amphibious soldiers to land in France on D-Day walked off their landing craft into waist deep water and waded 100 yards to dry land. There was surprisingly little response from the German defenders. Many Germans had been killed, and their guns destroyed, by the preliminary bombardment. The survivors were too dazed and numbed to provide an effective response. The beach area was cleared inside 3 hours and some 23,000 men and 28 tanks landed. Casualties were less than 200.
On the next beach to the east (Omaha) it was an entirely different matter. The U.S. 1st division ran into heavy artillery and machine gun fire as soon as the landing craft ramps were lowered. A lateral current along the beach shore had badly scattered the men and their units and in the confusion the exceptionally strong German fire took a large toll of the initial assault units. Many wounded men were drowned in the rising tide and the first wave, and subsequent waves, were initially stalled at the waterline. The majority of the American "swimming" tanks had been unloaded too far off shore and sank under the waves. This left the troops with only their personal weapons to oppose the many beach strong-points firing at them. Destroyers from the bombarding fleet raced in as close to the beach as they dared and provided some covering fire. The issue was in doubt for the first 3 hours and only through improvisation and courageous personal leadership were the troops at last able to get off the beach and onto the heights beyond. Nevertheless, by nightfall, some 34,000 men were ashore at a cost of 2,000 casualties. At this point the beachhead was only 2 miles deep.
Two US Ranger battalions scaled the 100-foot high cliffs at Point du Hoc, three miles west of Omaha Beach, to silence the six 155mm German howitzers said to be in that battery. The guns had previously been moved one mile inland and, by nightfall, the Rangers had suffered 60% casualties in overpowering the defending German troops and beating off counterattacks. Despite these losses they later found the guns and put them out of action.
The 3 beaches to the east of the invasion area, codenamed respectively Gold, Juno and Sword, were the responsibility of the Eastern task force – the British Second Army. Because of the later tide, and the fact they planned to land on a rising tide, their landings didn’t start until almost 7.30 a.m. On Gold beach, nearest to Omaha, the 50th Division and the 8th Armoured Brigade were scheduled to land with the tanks in the vanguard. Some initial assault units were pinned down by accurate German fire but others overran the defenders within half an hour. Subsequent waves gradually flanked the defenders and pushed inland. By nightfall they had advanced about 2.5 miles inland on a front of 3 miles. However they failed to link up with the American Omaha beachhead there being a gap of seven miles between them
The Canadian 3rd Division landed on Juno beach and met stiff initial resistance. Due to choppy seas they were ˝ an hour behind schedule. This left little time for the assault engineers to clear beach obstacles before the incoming tide covered them. The mined obstacles and German shells knocked out some 90 of the 306 landing craft but the Canadians attacked furiously and refused to be stopped. Parts of the assault group confronted strong defensive positions which delayed them until the afternoon. Other parts quickly overcame less vigourous German resistance and moved rapidly inland. By the end of the day they had almost reached their final D-Day objectives and were astride the vital Caen/Bayeux highway. They manage to link up with British troops from Gold beach and by the end of the day, their beachhead was 12 miles wide and 6 miles deep. But they were still 3 miles short of linking up with the British forces on their left – the Sword force.
The British 3rd Division on Sword beach also met intense opposition. They were behind schedule due to offshore reefs and tricky tidal currents. This gave the German defenders valuable time to recover from the earlier bombardment. Although the British broke through the crust of defenders in an hour the resultant congestion on the beaches behind them caused further delay. By early afternoon they had managed to expand their beachhead and link up with the 6th Airborne Division holding their left flank. In late afternoon they repulsed the only serious German counterattack against the beachheads destroying 76 out of a total 145 tanks from the 21st Panzer Division. However, they were stopped short of their vital D-Day objective of taking the port city of Caen.
By the end of the day, the Allied commanders were satisfied that "Overlord" was a success. While their beachheads were still not continuous, or as deep as planned, they had successfully broken through the coastal crust of German resistance. They had anticipated at least 10,000 dead but only about 2,500 men had lost their lives. Total casualties, including wounded, missing and prisoners were about 12,000 – 6,500 American; 3,500 British; and 1,000 Canadian
This article will analyze Operation OVERLORD in terms of the strategic and operational setting; examine campaign maneuvers, operational fires, and logistics; and conclude with a discussion of lines of operation as it applied in this situation.
Strategic Setting:
By the spring of 1944, Eisenhower's plan focused on the defeat of the German Army and its key industrial base. The strategic aims of the Allies were to " . . . enter the continent of Europe . . . and undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany [Ruhr industrial base] and the destruction of her armed forces" (Clausewitz's "hub of all activity" from which power emanated). The strategic aims of Germany were to retain control of large territorial gains in the West and avoid a second front in Europe.
Strategic Centers of Gravity:
The strategic center of gravity of the allies was the massive strength of the combined coalition forces in terms of relatively undepleated air, ground, and naval combat power which could be concentrated on the European Continent, a force which was complemented by US war production capability which was fully capable of supporting the coalition effort. The strategic center of gravity of Germany was its sizeable mobile ground combat force which could, in theory, be quickly deployed and concentrated against any invading allied force.
Strategic Vulnerabilities of the Allies and Germany:
An Allied invasion faced a number of problems and potential strategic vulnerabilities. Logistics (availability of landing craft, war supplies, and troop buildup in Great Britain), the need to achieve near total air superiority, the containment of the German submarine offensive capability, the destruction of the French rail and road networks, major operations in North Africa and Italy and the timing for ANVIL were strategic issues and potential vulnerabilities which legitimately delayed the invasion, first until 1943, and ultimately until summer of 1944.
Operational Aims:
Germany was confronted with the difficult operational predicament of predicting precisely where the attack would come and how to best defend against it with some 53 divisions spread throughout France. Also, Rommel was keenly aware of the impact of allied air superiority (operational fires) on any defense plan. Both Rundstedt and Rommel were reasonably convinced that the attack would come at the Pas de Calais. It was the closet point to the British coast and nearer to key objectives such as the Rhine River and Ruhr industrial complex. Both commanders and Hitler agreed that the early hours of any invasion would be critical. However, there was serious disagreement on how to deploy reserve forces and when to commit them. Rommel understood air power and knew that reserves would have to be deployed forward to be effective. The problem was exacerbated by Hitler's unwillingness to make key decisions and his decision to deploy the best units on the Eastern front. Hitler also placed unrealistic confidence in his Atlantic Wall and perceived advantages which would be gained from the "V" weapons.
Command Relationships:
Commencing with the ARCADIA Conference (Germany-first strategy) and continuing between 1941 through early 1944 the Allies did extensive planning for a cross-channel attack (COSSAC) and refined the joint command relationships which culminated with Eisenhower's selection as Supreme Commander in 1944 of all joint forces. The resultant staff was fully integrated with allied officers and designed to avoid the pitfalls identified from lessons learned in WW I. Eisenhower in effect became a unified commander with a functionally organized command. The Deputy Commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, was a veteran of the North Africa campaign and a strong proponent of combined operations. All allied Naval Forces were placed under the command of another British officer, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey. The US and British tactical air forces were combined and under the command of British Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. LTG Omar Bradley and General Sir Bernard Montgomery commanded US and British Army Groups respectively. This organizational structure resulted in the direct integration of the coalition forces and contributed significantly to their overall combat effectiveness.
Analysis:
Army Field Manual 100-5 recognizes five distinct forms of maneuver which a commander may employ against enemy forces. In deciding on a particular maneuver, the CINC should consider METT-T factors. Also, his statement of intent and concept of the operation should define how his operational fires will be used to support the particular maneuver. The five recognized forms of maneuver are: envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, and the frontal attack. Each was used successfully during OVERLORD.
The initial landings at Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno and Sword Beaches comprised a frontal assault by two US and three Allied Infantry Divisions on an area between the Carentan Estuary and the Orne River and the east cost of the Cotentin Peninsula. The VII Corps landing at Utah beach on the peninsula was preceded by an airborne assault by the US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions behind enemy lines north of Carentan, an infiltration maneuver designed to confuse and disrupt German defenses by maneuvering against their rear elements.(note 1).
The plan called for a rapid advance by VII corps which would link up with the airborne units and secure the port of Cherbourg and the peninsula. US forces would also drive south and cut off the Brittany Peninsula. The German situation was hampered by an absent Rommel and a refusal by Hitler and his staff to acknowledge that Normandy was the main thrust of the allied invasion. Consequently, key reserves under OKW control were not released in time to respond effectively. During the ensuing six week period Hitler still refused to redeploy 15th Army units, contrary to advice of his ground commanders, continuing to believe that an attack would come at the Pas de Calais. This was a critical period during which the Allies carved out the beach head area where they would eventually pour in a million man force and conduct the breakout (note 2).
After experiencing tough German opposition such as that encountered at St. Lo, the frustrations of war in the hedgerows, and fearing the possibility of a potential stalemate similar to that of WW I, Bradley, with Eisenhower's blessings, formulated Operation COBRA which, like the unsuccessful British Operation GOODWOOD, was designed to achieve a breakout.
Operation COBRA involved a six division penetration by a concentrated Allied force across the St Lo to Periers highway. Following heavy carpet bombing along a three mile front, on July 25th three US infantry divisions punched a hole in the German lines after which three mechanized divisions exploited the breach.
This was precisely the text book course followed by VIII Corps when it turned West into Brittany while the XV Corps raced toward Argentan. However, critics now see the Brittany move as operationally flawed since the Breton ports ended up having little significance to the overall effort and the forces would have been better employed in the Eastern drive. Indeed this required the expenditure gasoline which later proved to be in short supply during Third Army's race to the Rhine.
Hitler's response to the breakout was to order von Kluge to launch a counterattack on August 6th across the narrow corridor from Mortain through Avranches to the sea to cut off the US troops racing south. The effect of the German counterattack was to commit the German 7th Army deep into Allied territory and create the Argentan-Falaise pocket.
At this point, Bradley and Montgomery recognized that an attack South by the British 21st Army Group in conjunction with a sweep north by Patton's XV Corps could result in a classic double envelopment which would sever the German 7th Army lines of communication.
Operational Fires:
As previously noted, operational fires also played a key role in the success of OVERLORD. FM 100-7 defines this as the application of firepower to achieve a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation. Such fires are normally provided by assets other than those required for the routine support of tactical maneuver (Naval gunfire and Air assets). The use of such assets to destroy key bridges, roads and rail assets throughout France prior to D-Day severely hampered the ability of the Germans to maneuver in response to the invasion. Also, by June, 1944, the German Air Force had been virtually defeated, allowing the Allied Air Force to be used as a serious threat to any large scale vehicle and troop movements during day light hours.
Lines of Operation:
It is also instructive to examine the above described operations in terms of Jomini's theories about lines of operations. Jomini contended that all theaters have a base of operations (the lodgement area at Normandy and the modern concept of the COMMZ are examples) and that enemy strategic and decisive points (purists refuse to equate decisive points to centers of gravity, however the practical distinction is probably one of semantics) are attacked along lines of operations. According to FM 100-5, a force is employed on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point and it is closer to separate enemy forces than they are to each other e.g. the Allied situation in the first days of the invasion. By doctrine, interior lines benefit the weaker force since it has more flexibility in terms of lateral movement. The six division breakout in Operation COBRA is a good example. Conversely, a force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on an enemy force such as occurred when the Allies took advantage of the Mortain counter-attack and attempted to close the Falaise pocket.
In summary, the OVERLORD operation could have benefited from better operational planning. The failure to analyze key options and exploit fully certain operational advantages probably prolonged the war to some degree. While seemingly simple things such dealing with the hedgerow situation and giving more consideration as to which sector would best support Allied armor were missing from the plan, in balance OVERLORD must be viewed from an operation standpoint as one of history's greatest military achievements.
1. The drops did not go as smoothly as planned, once on the ground units were more disorganized than anticipated, and casualties were higher than expected (Clausewitz's friction at work). Nevertheless, the airborne drop was an operationally sound maneuver.
2. Initially, the lodgement area would have to hold a vast amount of logistical supplies. Initially, these supplies literally lined the beaches. After solving the logistical problems of actually marshaling and delivering the force .e.g. the landing craft problem, the next major logistical problem was to secure adequate ports to handle the flow of supplies and then insure that flow of supplies supported operational objectives.
Colonel John Osgood was so friendly to given me permission to use his article about “Operation Overlord”.
His site is very interesting and a must, for everybody who is interested in History!
(Kurt Van Laere).